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ABSTRACT

The paper delineates areas to investigate when seeking information about political ethics in western society. The main purpose of the paper is to call attention to the relationship of civic virtue to communal politics. Specifically, five questions are posed and answered which deal with various aspects of civic virtue and its relationship to private ethics. The first question asks in what sense the dominant form of western liberal political ethics can be characterized as private ethics. The answer is that the western liberal politics of interest-accommodation assumes a public interest composed of the sum of private interests, and the separation of diverse individual ideals from common political morality. The second question is whether civic virtue is a singular or plural concept. The answer suggests that civic virtue is not singular but is composed of a cluster of virtues, some of which overlap private virtues. To the third question of whether the concept of civic virtue implies an ethics of virtue, the paper responds positively and contrasts virtue ethics with utilitarian ethics. The fourth question inquires whether an ethics of virtue can help make good public policy. The response is that virtue ethics contribute to public policy by asking questions that are otherwise not asked. The final question asks how to reconcile private ethics and public ethics, and private virtue and public virtue. The answer suggests that such reconciliations will be encouraged with the help of political education conceived as moral and liberal education. (Author/BC)

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PRIVATE ETHICS AND CIVIC VIRTUE

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PRIVATE ETHICS AND CIVIC VIRTUE

My subject is civic virtue and its relationship to private ethics, a subject so vast that I must, for the purposes of this paper, confine myself to five somewhat disconnected questions:

1. In what sense is the dominant form of Western liberal political ethics best characterized as "private ethics"?

2. Is civic virtue singular?

3. Does the concept of civic virtue imply an ethics of virtue?

4. Can an ethics of virtue help us make good public policy?

5. How may private ethics and public ethics, private virtue and public virtue, best be reconciled?

Each of these questions of course generates several sub-questions, some of which, like "what is virtue?", may be more fundamental and troubling than the initial questions. Moreover, the whole discussion begs a few other questions, three of which might as well be stated at the outset and, if possible, set aside: 1. How is political ethics related to ethical thinking in general? 2. How is ethical thinking in general related to moral action? 3. Is there a dialectic of argument over ethics that leads to progressive resolutions or are ethical disputes only the verbal counterparts of the world's endless military conflicts?

PART ONE: IN WHAT SENSE IS THE DOMINANT FORM OF WESTERN LIBERAL POLITICAL ETHICS BEST CHARACTERIZED AS "PRIVATE ETHICS"?

For the last century or so, the dominant form of political ethics in Western liberal society has been utilitarianism. In its more sophisticated recent varieties utilitarianism places the good (the object of moral action) above the right (the content of moral action) and usually regards the highest attainable social good as the maximization or at least optimization of satisfaction, with each person's satisfaction theoretically counting the same as each other person's. It is teleological in the sense of being goal-oriented, consequentialist in the sense of placing good results ahead of the right motives of the actors, and is usually, though not always, hedonistic. There is some irony in the fact that "utilitarianism" comes from "utility", suggesting usefulness, since usefulness may not be the primary determining characteristic of utilitarian thought. Operationalism clearly is, however, a link with this impulse toward the useful. To the early utilitarians, being useful meant being non-metaphysical. The Benthamites were hedonists, but not individual or egoistic hedonists. Their "social hedonism" issued in the famous formula of the greatest happiness of the greatest number.

Utilitarianism was conceived in a problem-solving mode. As a moral standard it has been particularly compatible with Western competitive, interest-oriented, politics because it is individualistic, egalitarian,

offers a method of calculation for the making of decisions and is, in principle, applicable to large masses of people. Utilitarian thought patterns seem to parallel the notion that there is something called the public interest which is best conceived as a sum of private interests. The etymological link between interest as a citizen's concern and interest as money paid for the use of money may, in this connection, be of more than merely antiquarian significance. Economic analysis in general is suffused with utilitarian assumptions.[1] Legislative politics, which involves bargaining and compromise and voting as a method of recording preferences, seems especially amenable to utilitarian modes of thought. To maximize satisfactions, or, as is often jocularly said, equally to distribute dissatisfactions, is a central aim of most legislative politicians.

Utlitarian modes of thought work less well in judicial settings where obligation theory tends to prevail. Maximizing the satisfactions of victim, criminal, jury, media, police, attorneys, and various publics is not the typical judge's approach. Whether a law should be enforced is not usually allowed to turn on a determination of the good consequences of a particular enforcement of it. Nevertheless, the growth of plea bargaining in American courts is a sign that the pattern of thinking I have been discussing is not wholly irrelevant even to the operation of courts.

The theoretical limitations of utilitarianism are well-known and may be briefly reviewed:

1. The maximization of satisfaction is not a very elevated moral ideal. People may be easily, if temporarily, satisfied by gross pleasures. John Stuart Mill, who coined the term utilitarianism, notoriously lapsed from its implications when he declared that Socaftes dissatisfied is worth more than a pig satisfied. The systematic balancing of competing interests may mean, furthermore, that the most satisfaction any participant in the moral equation can hope for, or perhaps should expect, is a slight gain in material interest, a prudent advantage. Some would argue that so long as a person is only seeking and finding material advantage, even when portrayed as a long-run "enlightened self-interest", genuine morality does not come into play. As Glaucon implied in his question in Book II of Plato's *Republic*, perhaps we are only being moral when we are able to act <u>against</u> our advantage for some higher good. Hence, utilitarianism, however helpful in providing a formula for what will be most advantageous in securing the most non-moral goods for the most number of persons, may not be able to answer the question of what <u>moral</u> use is usefulness?[2]

2. Thoroughgoing utilitarianism can concede no independent moral weight to promises, obligations, duties, right motives, and good will, the essential ingredients in deontological ethics (*deontos*, being bound). The disregard for promising creates difficulties. James Cargile[3] offers a variation on an old story that illustrates this: Smith and Jones are on a desert island. Smith loves flowers, Jones doesn't. Smith, dying, says, "Jones, promise me that when I am gone you will water my flowers." Jones

says "Yes, of course, dear friend." Smith, full of gratitude, dies. Jones, who is hungry, promptly tears up Jones' flower garden, makes a salad, and eats it. The utilitarian does not apologize for Jones' behavior. Yet it may be necessary, says Cargile, to learn to live with a double standard, one for actions and another for persons. Hence in this case it may be necessary to approve of Jones' action without approving of his ability to do it. The illustration and the comment on it suggests not only that promise-keeping and good will constitute a rival to the ethics of utilitarianism, but that there may be still a third and a different ethics, an ethics of character. To this subject I shall return.

A distribution of goods that will in the long run maximize satisfactions may also, in the short run, be unjust. For example, a greater total balance of pleasure over pain might be attainable by excluding some disliked minority from a share of society's goods; but that would be unjust. Justice and utility may, in some instances, be irreconcilable. John Rawls has much enlightened us on such questions.[4]

Needless to say, these simple contrasts between promising and utility and utility and justice do not do justice to the many complications arising in a systematic comparison of utilitarianism and deontology, e.g., the duties arising from utilitarian demands; Sidgwick's distinction between the utility of an act and the utility of the praise of it; the utility of not performing an act harmless in itself but harmful if everyone did it. These considerations have led to the distinctions between "extreme" and "restricted" utilitarianism, and between act-utilitarianism and rule-utilitarianism.[5]

It is the teleological equality of utilitarianism that I most want to emphasize here. Being a consequentialist and being a teleologist are distinguishable. That is, one may value acts by their consequences without seeing those consequences as a goal or an end. It is hard to imagine a sane person claiming to be moral while being utterly scornful of all possible consequences: "My motives are pure, therefore it is justifiable to destroy the world." W.D. Hudson has shown with admirable succinctness how, in daily life, we constantly blend utilitarian and deontological arguments.[6]

3. Utilitarianism, insofar as it is oriented toward problem-solving, insofar as it presents itself as a decision technique, and insofar as it is egalitarian, must assume the existence of individuals who are autonomous, self-directing, self-interested, and to a degree rational in following those interests, whether or not such traits can be shown empirically to exist. It may be said that all ethical systems must make such assumptions, but that is not necessarily the case. On the one hand, as I have suggested, other systems assume that persons can act against self-interest, and, on the other hand, utilitarianism has a special historical and logical connection with certain beliefs about how people really behave. Practicality is one of its implicit claims.

4. The values, goals, impulses, ideals and principles not reduceable to calculatable self-interest, not able to be aggregated into a utilitarian formula, are taken to be, if not irrational, at least outside the realm of rational discourse about morals, and therefore private and subjective, parallel in status to what the economists call "externalities". This means

that despite the avowed concern for consequences, some consequences are ignored.

Applied to our central question, these aspects of utilitarian thinking seem to support the conclusion that utilitarianism and the broader liberal individualism that lies behind it tend to ignore the possibility of political action for genuinely public purposes. Somewhat paradoxically, what is private, as in "private interest" tends to be seen from the liberal-utilitarian perspective as the building blocks of "public interest" (or sometimes even of "the public good") while at the same time various aesthetic, religious, and communal purposes that in other contexts might be considered inescapably "public" are relegated to the sphere of the private. In the framework of liberal-utilitarianism they are not intrinsically public, but, so to speak, become public only when filtered through the screen of private interest.

This viewpoint can be illustrated by a trenchant and significant article written a good many years ago by Peter Strawson and widely reprinted: "Social Morality and Individual Ideal".[7] Like R.M. Hare in *Freedom and Reason,* Strawson sees an inevitable tension between abstract ideals and personal interests and declares that a resolution of the tension cannot or should not occur in the attempt at finding a higher, unifying ideal. Indeed, the whole of what he calls the "region of the moral" is tied to the concept of interest: ". . .a demand made on an individual is to be regarded as a moral demand only if it belongs to a system of demands which includes demands made on others in his interest."[8] Moral interests take the form of procedural safeguards that may include "the abstract virtue of justice, some

form of obligation to mutual aid and to mutual abstention from injury and, in some form and in some degree, the virtue of honesty." He shies away from "thoroughgoing egoism" and thinks it an "exaggeration" to make all morality merely prudential. Belonging to "a moral community cannot merely be a matter of convenience." Nevertheless, he severely limits the realm of morality to what may be considered self-protective practices sanctioned by a community. The significance of the article, however, is not merely that the realm of morality is so limited, but that Strawson recognizes another realm in which all sorts of ideals of the good life and of right relations between persons can flower. All this is or ought to be outside the domain of the community, especially the political community, and in the domain of free individuals. Strawson rather confusingly labels this other realm the "region of the ethical":

> It is indeed impossible that one life should realize all the ideal pictures which may at one time or another attract or captivate the individual imagination. But the owner of one life may with perfect practical consistency wish that his conflicting images should all be realized in different lives.[9]

The region of the moral must not be too demanding lest it restrict the imagination ofindividuals and interfere wi.. the free flow of individuals moving from one subgroup to another. Any state in which there is an ideal picture widely accepted that demands "a comprehensive common morality. . . . will evidently be subject to at least some stresses from which a liberal society is free."

This liberal society does not know a Kantian kingdom of ends, even in prospect. Ethical diversity, like aesthetic diversity, is to be welcomed. The liberal is the "enemy of all those whose single intense vision of the

ends of life drives them to try to make the requirements of the ideal coextensive with those of common social morality."[10] For Strawson "ethical" values are individual and plural; "moral" values are communal and singular. Rather than saying that the "moral" values are superior (or safe) because communal, he says they are inferior (or threatening) because singular.

Most of us in liberal societies share to some degree this view that politics in a complex society is bound to be the realm of the lesser evil; and most twentieth century men and women who have experienced totalitarianism fear the monolithic public moral standard. It is, we say, a misplaced tribal morality. Yet in relation to the anomie of industrialized life, others may look more sympathetically on the moral quality of tribal societies. Their members we are told, may eat less and suffer more, but also enjoy life more than anomic, jaded, driven Westerners. Do not the real terrors of the Third World belong to the displaced villagers, those who face political oppression, urban unemployment and hopelessness because economic necessity has driven them out of their tribal setting?[11]

Roberto Mangabiera Unger describes as part of the liberal-capitalist mentality,

> . . . the weightlessness that is its fear of all social bonds as threats to individuality. Men begin by not recognizing the common humanity they share with persons far from them. Then even those who are close become foreign to them. Finally, through this unending disruption of community, they become strangers to themselves. . . . The measure of knowledge is [becomes?] the capacity to persuade others of the truth of one's belief rather than any direct apprehension of the essence of things. It is through the assent of others that one is rescued from the opacity of the world, just as their approval is the sole cure of one's weightlessness in society. [12]

Liberal man, then, says Unger, joins a pantomime: "Only in the private enjoyments of love, art and religion does one find respite, for they recall to his mind the image of that wholeness and perfection of being to which he has never ceased secretly to aspire."[13]

Unger sets against this negative view of the present, a vision of "organic groups." Hannah Arendt shares to some degree Unger's vision of a transforming and uniting communal politics. If self-selected councils, she says, could break up mass society,

> the joys of public happiness and the responsibilities for public business would then become the share of those few from all walks of life who have a taste for public freedom and cannot be "happy" without it. Politically, they are the best, and it is the task of good government and the sign of a self-ordered republic to assure them of their rightful place in the public realm.[14]

Strawson and Unger and Arendt may or may not be representative figures. The defenders of community (from the Marxists to Robert Nisbet) could, at endless length, be arrayed against the defenders of individualism (from the anarchists to Robert Nozick or Milton Friedman). But such exposition would not be central to my aim, which is at this moment to throw into the cauldron of communal concepts a concept of civic virtue.

PART TWO: IS CIVIC VIRTUE SINGULAR?

The question is asked as a vehicle for discussing the concept; but, not to dally, the answer to the above question is negative. There is no single civic virtue, but rather there is a cluster of virtues that, taken together, may be said to comprise civic virtue, the special virtue of the citizen. The citizen is, as Rousseau reminded us, not merely a resident of a town, but a member of the city, one who has the qualifications to participate in deciding what the community shall do. "Public citizen" is a redundancy. "Private citizen" is a contradiction in terms, and the term's frequent use in our polity is a mark of our political-moral confusion.

Just as there are a cluster of specific virtues (to be discussed in a moment) that comprise civic virtue, civic virtue can be seen as a part of virtue generally. The term virtue (in Greek, *aretē*; in Latin, *virtù*) can be used in the singular to refer to general moral excellence ("He is virtuous"). In the plural, it can mean a highly specific excellence ("Among his virtues is . . ."). It has been used in different centuries and sometimes in the same century to mean strength, power, vigor, energy, manliness, as well as moral excellence. If we follow Aristotle,[15] this quality of excellence is not an emotion (*pathos*), for emotions are transcient and unreliable, and not merely a capacity (*dynamis*), for capacities may go unexercised, but a "characteristic" (*hexis* --- the common Latin translation was *habitus*, hence the English "habit"), which suggests a trait that must be more than latent. Virtue cannot exist without being exercised. As a contemporary

student of virtue ethics puts it, to be called virtuous, a person should do the right thing for the right motive, and have an enduring disposition to do such things, and have established this disposition through the testing of adversity.[16]

Virtues (except the intellectual virtue associated with contemplation) must be displayed in action. Because they may be displayed in habitual actions they may even be unconscious. Indeed, it is one attribute of virtuous people that they are not too aware of their virtues, which, as we shall see, raises serious questions about the character of "public" virtues and the teaching of any virtue. Whereas duty is "accepted", virtue is "displayed"; whereas duty is "acted on", virtue is "acted out"; whereas one learns virtues, one learns about utilities and obligations.

A fundamental quality of virtues is that they are supererogatory. That is, they are displayed "above and beyond" normal moral obligations. Obligations, to be acted on as obligations, must be felt and hence must be quite conscious. Usually they are felt in a negative way: "I have to take my mother to the dentist." Virtues are positive. One way to put this is to say that the failure to carry out an obligation is blameworthy, whereas the failure to display a virtue is not, even though the display of that virtue may be praiseworthy. We usually do not praise persons for fulfilling their obligations, though we may praise them for the way they fulfill them, say, in a cheerful spirit. We may say of the virtuous, "He didn't have to go out of his way to help, but he did." Already we can see that virtue has a less obvious connection with politics and the law than

deontological theories, simply because politics and law, by definition, create obligations. Yet, though the connection of supererogatory virtue to politics is not obvious, we should not conclude that virtue is irrelevant to politics. Virtue is praiseworthy. And one of the important characteristics shared by political and moral arguments (if, indeed, they can be realiably distinguished) is the common assumption that human action may be altered by praise or blame. For us to speak of civic virtue at all implies, not that civic virtue *per se* can be taught, which is a slightly different issue, but that persons can serve as moral exemplars of civic virtue. We may agree with John Stuart Mill or H.L.A. Hart that law should not interfere with any person's freedom solely on the grounds of improving his character, for law is capable of reliably controlling only external actions. Nevertheless, moral exemplars can reach persons in a way and to a degree that no law can touch. We do not speak of moral exemplars today. We talk of role-models, and we justify Affirmative Action and other programs for minorities in terms of their assistance in creating role-models. This may be but an up-dated version of civic virtue.

Alasdair MacIntyre has recently offered a new and quite ingenious definition of virtue. It is, he says, ". . . an acquired human quality the possession and exercise of which tend to enable us to achieve those goods which are internal to practices and the lack of which effectively prevent us from achieving any such goods."[17] Crucial to this definition, of course, is the distinction between external and internal goods as well as the notion of a "practice", a term made fashionable by John Rawls. The

illustrations of practices MacIntyre give tend to run toward games, but any human activity with intrinsic standards of excellence bearing their own authority will do. The external goods are what one wins by succeeding at the practice---money, fame, medals, promotions. They are like property, the more one person has the less others have. Internal goods are the rewards that come to a participant in a practice that can only come from participating in that practice. They are, when achieved, however, goods that do not detract from others, but benefit (potentially) everyone. The example he gives is that a home run champion in baseball may receive the accolades of the crowd or a better salary, external goods, but if he achieved what he did by developing a new batting style, the rewards to himself of such an act of creativity are internal, while the result, a new batting style, can be copied by anyone. Only a person who has had experience in the practice can even judge its internal goods. The virtues are, then, those goods by which we define our relationship to others who are in a practice and share its purposes and standards.

MacIntyre's discussion begins by a consideration of the great variety of virtues that different people in different ages have regarded as basic. He reviews the preferences of Homer, Aristotle, the New Testament, Jane Austen, and Benjamin Franklin. Using his definition he finds that certain virtues are common to all practices: e.g., courage, since to participate at all requires courage; justice, since to get internal goods from a practice requires recognition of what is due to whom (one who cheats at cards can get no internal goods from the game); honesty, since accurate reports

and listening to criticism are essential to effective participation, etc.

What is odd about MacIntyre's interesting conception is his use of the word "goods" which so much retains a teleological cast. He does not say that virtue is the internal good, it is the "human quality" (a somewhat more vague term than "virtue") that enables us to get internal goods. Though MacIntyre is critical of utilitarianism and teleologists,[18] nevertheless he sees virtue as something that is a means to an end rather than an end in itself, in somewhat the same way that the utilitarian sees the moral good as a means to a non-moral good. As some theorists have tried to bring deontology and utilitarianism together in the conception of "rule-utilitarianism" MacIntyre, consciously or not, seems to be trying to bring together utilitarianism and traditional theories of virtue. Nevertheless, as standards of judgment it is doubtful whether the good, the right, and excellence of character can ever be formally reduced to each other.[19]

So much (though it is hardly enough) for virtue. What of civic virtue? Almost by definition justice must be considered the preeminent civic virtue (or "political virtue" if *polis* and *civitas* are taken to be roughly equivalent). We know that justice is a quality that may be displayed either by a political system or by an individual person, and if Plato was not absolutely sure whether one could be derived from the other, no one since has been convincing on the point either. If justice or justness (which might be a better term for the individual's virtue) is a kind of proportionality that gives each person his or her due, it is probably also a kind of proportionality in relating the other political or civic virtues to each other.

Aristotle argues that what is just without qualification is not the same as political justice. Political justice operates between men who are outside of law only by analogy, "For justice exists only between men whose mutual relations are governed by law."[20] Moreover, to be truly just or unjust one must act with full information and conscious choice. Unjust consequences may flow from acts that are not unjust. If committed in ignorance they are merely mistakes.[21] In other words civic justice requires a *civitas*, and civic justice requires knowledgeable choice. Yet, as we have seen, for Aristotle virtues may be habitual, a seeming paradox.

The civic virtues, for Plato, included courage, with whose inclusion we would have to concur. It is hard to imagine a truly excellent political leader or citizen who turns and runs at the first sign of danger. Courage is probably the most easily understood and least controversial civic virtue, although as we shall see in Part Three its status is not wholly without ambiguity. Another classical civic virtue is moderation or, better, self-restraint (*sophrosyne*) which is a kind of proportionality in its own right, curbing the rush to excitable excess, or prideful ambition. Composure, self-control and quietness are part of its quality. The interplay between justness and *sophrosyne* can be very subtle, for the former may drive one to the edge of righteous rebellion even as the latter counsels restraint. The fourth of Plato's virtues is wisdom; but for politics *sophia*, the highest wisdom, wisdom which can only come from contemplation, may be too high ever to reside in partnership with political success. The allegory of the cave may be a lesson in what philosophers, the men of

highest virtue, could not do. That, at least, is the question Plato raised to the level of an endless haunting wonder. But practical wisdom, or good judgment, *phronesis*, is certainly a civic virtue. The good sense of a man capable of sound judgment under stress may not, as even intellectuals reluctantly concede, be a wholly intellectual quality. It is a quality of tough-mindedness combined with a sensitivity that may be partly but only partly intellectual.

Despite Aristotle's attempts at uniformity of categories and his effort to explain all virtues as a mean between excess and lack, not all of these classical virtues are necessarily identical in form. For example, as N.J.H. Dent shows, the "order of dependence" between inner dispositional states and external acts may be quite different for different virtues. We may properly answer the question of what moderate acts are by looking at the acts of a man whose character is judged to be moderate. But we are apt to reverse this process in the case of justice and answer the question of what a just man is by looking at acts judged to be just.[22] This variation, as we shall see in Part Five, makes it harder to inculcate virtues than obligations by precept.

Other ages and other places of course have had differing views of what constitutes virtue as well as civic virtue. The virtues of the gentleman, according to Baldassare Castiglione (1478-1529) in his *Book of the Courtier*,[23] which influenced the English as well as the Italian courts, included four special qualities: *gravita riposta*, doing nothing in haste or anxiety; *sprezzatura*, the capacity to conceal artifice, to give the look of unpre-

meditated acts; *leggiadria*, the discipline of charm and grace; and *grazia*, which was more than grace, or perhaps less, being the potentiality to acquire grace as a gift of nature. Only one or two of these would today win votes in the Bronx. Henry More's *Enchridion Ethicum*, or *An Account of Virtue* (Latin 1666, English, 1690), treated the following as subheads ("reductive virtues") of justice: liberality, magnificence, veracity, gratitude, candor, urbanity, fidelity, modesty, humanity (i.e., love of mankind), hospitality, affability, courtesy. Plato and most writers since have been more rigorous than that. By such reasoning justice would not only be the whole of civic virtue, but more.

I must avoid here a catalog of primary, secondary and tertiary civic virtues, as intriguing and novel as that effort would be in the twentieth century, to ask simply whether there are any other obvious civic virtues besides justness, courage, self-restraint, and practical judgment. Hannah Arendt, something of a classicist herself, adds to the four two more political virtues, promise-keeping and forgiveness. The need for promise-keeping should be obvious, even though politicians are always being accused of breaking promises. The entire fabric of economic as well as political life rests upon a network of agreements and promises, most of which are not written down. The disappearance of general trust in that network can rapidly lead to social chaos. Daily life abounds in promises: "Yes, we will install the brass bushings at the same cost." "I will inform Jones of our decision." "I will vote for your bill, if I can." Most campaign promises are not iron-

clad promises. "We will give the matter our urgent attention" may be a slightly exaggerated prediction more than a promise. The careful politician will qualify frequently. "I will vote for your bill, if I can." But anxious constituents may not remember or even note the qualification. There are times when promises made with the best of intentions should be broken, suggesting that while promise-keeping is an important virtue, it is not an ultimate virtue.

Forgiveness may be even more fundamental as a civic virtue than promise-keeping, though rarely acknowledged as such. So much of political life is infected by a spirit of revenge that we forget that uncountable and largely anonymous acts of forgiveness are essential to forestall the substitution of violence for politics.

As George Kateb explains in his masterful article on Hannah Arendt,[24] the list of virtues she excludes from civic virtue is more striking than her short list of included virtues. Courage, promise-keeping, and forgiveness and perhaps self-control all arise, in her view, out of something called "the will to act." Ambition (though often thought to be a vice rather than a virtue) is ruled out in favor of "emulation." But "love", "goodness","conscience", "compassion" and "pity" are apolitical virtues in Arendt's view because they are private and may be speechless and what is political must be public and of speech. Compassion and pity may lead to sentimentalizing issues and become a justification for terror, as they were in Robespierre, St. Just, and Lenin. Jesus of Nazareth and Melville's Billy Budd are her examples of how apolitical is Christian *agapé*.[25] Rousseau, we remember, made a strong case that Christian virtue is not only

marginal to civic virtue but destructive of it. Many respected theorists, from Thomas Aquinas to Reinhold Niebuhr, would dispute this. In fact, we have not yet seen any large society in which Christian virtue in the sense of agapic self-sacrifice is sufficiently widespread to provide hard empirical evidence. It is no doubt safe to say that even an idealized civic virtue stands in a relationship of tension to almost any transcendental religious virtue; and this point may not be much different from Leo Strauss's claim that civic virtue corresponds to the vulgar justice of the city and not the higher justice of the philosopher.[26]

To sum up, civic virtue is not singular but plural. It consists of a cluster of "public" virtues, such as justness and courage, which may at the edges overlap with "private" virtues, such as generosity or kindliness. To say that virtue may be public is not to suggest that it is organic or collective, for the latter implies a theory of institutional selfhood I am unable to defend. Both public and private virtue can be, must be, individualized. But this is not to say that membership in a particular group may not be a prerequisite to the acquisition of a virtue characteristic of that group. For example, all the members of some groups are more uxorious than all the members of some other groups. Nor is this to deny that the political community itself may, in some metaphorical sense, display a counterpart of personal virtue in its public acts. To say that the British nation in 1940 displayed courage under fire and *sophrosyne* in its treatment of German aliens is not to misuse language.

PART THREE. DOES THE CONCEPT OF CIVIC VIRTUE IMPLY AN ETHICS OF VIRTUE?

The question can be rephrased to read: does virtue-ethics relate to civic virtue in somewhat the same way that utilitarianism relates to the politics of interest accommodation or deontology relates to the politics of law? The answer would seem to be affirmative. Ethics in no sense determines these activities or concepts, but it relates to them in a mode of description or prescription. Ethics, I would argue, is best seen as a field of study, and morality as a form of action. Ethicists need not be moral men, only men interested in morals. Descriptive ethics analyses the arguments of those claiming to be moral. Prescriptive ethics makes moral claims, but uses analytical language in doing so. Meta-ethics analyses what certain moral terms mean. Moral psychology tries to analyse why persons acting morally so act. All four enterprises are in an analytical rather than an active mode, which refutes the early simple positivist claim that ethics, being valuational, cannot be analytical. It is unfortunate that the popular usage of words such as "morals" and "ethics" are so mixed up. Business and Legislative "Codes of Ethics" for example, have little ethics in them. They tend to be codes of approved conduct.

It is conceivable that a heavy emphasis on academic ethics may actually inhibit civic virtue. "The 'harmoniously' virtuous type of person may effectively lead a clean and exemplary life, rich in moral accomplishments, without a more than occasional awareness of moral scruples and without intense and central moral awareness."[27] The Spartans, if Rousseau is to be believed, had abundant civic virtue, but little systematic thought about it. Small,

simple, close-knit and isolated communities would seem to breed communal virtue (whether or not it is "civil") more demonstrably than large, complex, pluralistic, individualistic societies. Yet the latter are more likely to generate philosophic speculation. The university is an urban phenomenon. Athens, which might seem to be an exception to this rule had more visible civic virtue in Periclean times than in the times of the great philosophers. It may be that people worry about public ethics as a theoretical problem only when the polity is already on the skids, a thought which should give pause to writers of papers such as this. But, having paused, let us not be overwhelmed by the complexities of political anthropology, but rather push on to manageable theoretical-ethical issues. Four such issues can be looked at here:

a) does virtue require or preclude the presence of certain desires?

b) are virtues adverbial or substantive, a matter of style or content?

c) can virtuous acts validly be prescribed?

d) are virtues states of being or states of doing?

a) Aristotle argued that virtues are not emotions. They are not subjective feelings but objective excellences. We would not usually call a man courageous who did not lift a finger to help a drowning child, but simply stood on the river bank feeling courageous. On the other hand, neither would we call him courageous if, blank of mind, he stumbled and fell into the river, allowing the child inadvertently to be saved by clinging to the stumbler's coattails. It would seem that virtue is more than a capacity to act, and more than a desire to act, yet also is something other than pure action. Some such consideration led Kant to a concept of good will independent of emotions. He was suspicious of virtues because he conceived them as being tied to desires, inclinations, and emotions, which

compromise pure moral will. But pure moral will seems either unreal or inefficacious.

b) Socrates held that virtue is more than a tendency to act in a certain way; it could be the basis for organizing one's whole life. Virtue, he thought, does not come from what is valuable, but what is valuable comes from virtue.[28] By contrast, modern "adverbial" interpretations of virtue not only emphasize virtue as doing, but stress how something is done more than what is done. However, M.F. Burnyeat[29] argues that vices are more equivalent to a style of behavior than virtues. They are more "external". It is easier to mimic cowardice than courage, greed than moderation, impatience than patience. Correspondingly (and this may be one reason we are leery of virtue) it is easier to fake a virtue than a vice; there is less that is overt. Vices are often expressions of a natural impulse which a corresponding virtue would check. Virtues can be referred to in an adverbial manner, but as Socrates in *Charmides* shows, there is a significant difference between adverbs. "He slowly declined" is external description. "He modestly declined" refers to moral substance. Modesty is not just a manner.

So virtue, according to reputable ethicists, involves more than emotional feelings and more than style.

c) It was the identification of virtue with moral feelings that led H.A. Prichard in an influential article in 1912 ("Does Moral Philosophy Rest Upon a Mistake?") to dismiss the possibility of virtue ethics in a footnote. In the view of William Frankena and Stanley Cunningham the dismissal set back the prospects of a developed ethics of virtue for two or three generations. Prichard so brilliantly and sharply separated right actions from inner desires that he almost disconnected them: ". . . we can

only feel an obligation to act; we cannot feel an obligation to act from a certain desire."[30] Oughtness to be felt, must be in our power, but our feelings are not in our power. There is, we must recognize, a certain plausibility in this. We do not give much credit for moral perspicacity to the cruise director who says, "Alright, now, everybody, you will be happy!" The mistake of modern moral philosophy, thought Prichard, was to seek to prescribe obligatory moral feelings, and thereby aim to tell us what to do in specific situations. If this quest is futile, our choice is between judging morality by good consequences or by a non-emotional ought such as Kant's "good will". Oddly, even though Prichard would not allow us to be morally obligated by, say, specific courageous feelings, he did allow us to be morally obligated by the intuitive feeling that we should want to become courageous. His view was a great encouragement to intuitionist deontology.

Virtues, including civic virtues, are praised. If they are praised justifiably, the justification can rest on characterological qualities independent of either non-willed consequences or non-emotional willed obligations. John Laird, probably the best virtue ethicist of the twentieth century ("agent-ethics" he called his position),[31] argues that inner emotional states are a proper concern for moral judgment. We expect a virtuous man to control his temper. When we say to a self-pitying friend, "Cheer up!" this can often count as a valid moral prescription. Similar moral weight can attach to concern with political morale or esprit de corps, or the confidence a community displays in its leaders.

d) Much of the foregoing can be reduced to the question of whether virtues are states of being or states of doing. Leslie Stephen, in 1882, said "The moral law has to be expressed in the form 'be this' not in the form 'do this.' . . . the true moral law says 'hate not,' instead of 'kill not.' . . . the only mode of stating the moral law must be as a rule of character."[32] One obvious political consequence of this view is that characterological political-moral injunctions can cover more potential situations ("hate not") than can behavioral political-moral injunctions ("kill not").

William Frankena is one of the relatively few contemporary ethicists who has incorporated characterological ethics in his theories:

> . . . we must now conclude that the most adequate theory of moral value is a mixed one which advocates cultivating those traits that tend most fully to express themselves in benevolent and/or just action. Among these, of course, will be benevolence and justice themselves, considered now as dispositions or traits of character rather than as principles of prima facie duty.[33]

Benevolence and justice, then, become for Frankena "first order" virtues, while conscientiousness, moral courage, integrity, and Kantian good will become "second order" virtues. Most of the practical virtues, he feels, can be derived from the two first-order virtues. The second order virtues are more abstract and serve as background factors.

Two concluding observations will suggest the basic differences in orientation of the three forms of ethics I have adumbrated: 1. Utilitarianism is future-oriented; deontology is past-oriented; virtue-ethics is present-oriented. 2. The fundamental premise of virtue-ethics is that the preservation of personality is to be preferred over the preservation of external goods, or the preservation of rules.

If utilitarian ethics is the dominant legislative ethics, and if deontological ethics is the dominant judicial ethics, then virtue-ethics might be the dominant executive ethics. We do, in fact, and not just since Watergate, care even more what our Mayors and Governors and Presidents are than what they do---or, to put it more accurately, we care proportionately less what our legislators and judges are and more what they do. To refine the matter still further, for very public figures, the line between what one is and what one does tends to dissolve. Executives as role-models, symbolized by the pictures of Presidents on school house walls, have a less visible counterpart in the role-model of the "good citizen" (even though "good citizen" Ralph Nader or Barry Commoner or John Gardner, for example, in the curious logic of our privativistic mentality, are seen to be less good citizens as they become more "political").

The concept of civic virtue does imply an ethics of virtue, and a developed ethics of virtue can both describe what civic virtue is and prescribe what it ought to be.

PART FOUR: CAN AN ETHICS OF VIRTUE HELP US MAKE GOOD PUBLIC POLICY?

By a precise definition public policy issues are not in every case "moral". But far more are closer in form and structure to moral issues than those few that are popularly tabbed "moral", like abortion, homosexuality or marijuana possession. It is a measure of the privatization of our political thinking that those issues labeled "moral" are the ones most clearly linked to what is done in private. Most political issues are thought to be, somehow, outside the realm of the moral. Yet the form of personal and private questions with moral overtones is, in fact, generally very close to the form of public policy questions:

Would it be right to loan Henry $50?
Would it be right to loan Indonesia $250 million?

Should we (my family) sell our house and buy a new one?
Should we (the School Board) close School A. and construct a new one?

Should I get an abortion?
Should tax moneys be spent to pay for abortions?

Should I complain to the boss about Bill's outrageous remark
or let it pass?
Should we officially protest to the Soviets about Gromyko's remark?

Should I quit smoking?
Should we end subsidies to tobacco farmers?

Should I buy a gun?
Should we enact gun control legislation?

Should I install solar heating in our house?
Should we build more nuclear power plants?

It is no objection to say that factual, technical and tactical as well as moral issues are raised by such questions, for that is true of any practical question. The point is simply that moral issues are relevant to both public and private policy-type questions and in very much the same way. Following R.M. Hare I will stipulate that the characteristic of moral statements is that they have prescriptivity---the speaker is committed to its commendatory or recommendatory elements---and universalizability---they imply that any human person in the same situation should be likewise committed.[34] Though it is possible to imagine some public policy issues that are non-universalizable in this sense, they would be rare, and would probably, in the most narrow technical sense, be legal rather than political. It is hard to imagine a realistic question of genuine public policy without these two elements of moral judgment.

Our question is whether the ethics of virtue have anything to contribute to such judgments. Because we in the West have come to set up public policy questions in a problem-solving framework, at the very outset a utilitarian calculation of a balance of interests and satisfactions will be most obviously relevant, and I have no wish to deny that. Because we are a legalistic culture, the deontological summing up of pertinent rules, duties, and obligations will also command respect. I have no wish to deny that, either. But it may be well to remind ourselves that ethics as such, prescriptive as well as descriptive ethics, is not equipped to provide certain answers to practical questions. Its function, rather, is to make sure the right questions are asked. It sets criteria. It examines (descriptive ethics) or challenges (prescriptive ethics) presuppositions.

Hence, on the issue of guns, the utilitarian will ask: Will this gun control legislation maximize the satisfactions of the citizens? The deontologist will ask: What are the moral (and legal) obligations of citizens with reference to hand guns? The virtue ethicist will ask: What is the attitude of the citizen of excellent character on the question of owning hand guns? The first two questions are obviously more attuned to problem-solving than the third. The "solution", if any, would come in the third case not from a new statute or a court order, but from the contagion of a good example (it will be a different kind of contagion of course if the citizen of civic virtue finds he should rather than should not own a hand gun). That the moral example of rare and isolated citizens may be weak is not particularly relevant. There are weak statutes and court orders, too. The point is that the question of civic virtue should be asked often and in as systematic a way as possible.

My example of gun-control may be a biased example,being inherently geared to individual characterological traits. Let us try another, more impersonal, example: nuclear power. Does the construction of more nuclear power plants maximize satisfactions? What moral obligations devolve upon those proposing to construct or to obstruct nuclear power plants? What attitude should the citizen of civic virtue (one who is just, courageous, self-restrained, wise, promise-keeping, forgiving, benevolent) display toward the construction or obstruction of nuclear power plants? One feels one's interests more keenly than one feels one's obligations, and one is smitten by virtue least often of all. Moreover, the asking of the question produces virtue no more certainly than mere questions produce satis-

factions or a sense of obligation. But, again, that is not the point. The questions should be asked. Confronted with an energy crisis, the citizen may say, "I am not obliged to give up my second automobile and my air conditioning." To which some civic ethicist needs to respond, "No, you are not obliged, perhaps, but the issue does not end there. . . ." Ecological issues especially (conserving and preserving air, water, space, energy, resources) are of such a nature that their resolution is impossible without the voluntary cooperation of millions of individual citizens whose separate actions may be quite beyond the reach of effective law enforcement.

We, in fact, appeal to civic virtue under different names all the time. The local hero, benefactor, good Samaritan, disinterested advocate, good citizen, is celebrated somewhere in each issue of every local newspaper. Behind the appeal to a utilitarian decision formula is an all too potent sense of self interest. Behind the appeal to deontological commitment lies an implicit communal authority. Behind the appeal to civic virtue lies a vision of what human existence should be. Can this vision be, as Strawson would seem to argue, private? For most cultures what is private has been viewed as shameful, like one's private parts, and what is public has been viewed as in the domain of glory. Are we ready to reverse this order?

Though the idea cannot be fully developed here, it must be mentioned that the utilitarian ethics of interest-accommodation may be contrary to the ethics of virtue not only because they ask different questions but because they reflect radically different understandings of the character

of ethical principles. The former sees ethical principles (its own as well as those of other schools) as primarily means of problem-solving, as devices for bringing about desired ends. The latter may see ethical principles as guides for thinking about the morally ambiguous and indeterminable, and of possibly making us better persons even if immediate problems are not solved. It may be a mistake to think that political ethics is exhausted by the determination of good things to do, conceived as goals. If moral principles are seen as technical devices, which is the perennial utilitarian temptation, then persons wrestling with actual human dilemmas, actual human tragedies, may sometimes grow in moral experience only by abandoning certain moral principles.[35]

In this part of the paper I have, under the heading of public policy, been looking, in effect, at the utilitarian value of virtue ethics. Though it is important to note, as I just have, that problem-solving through correct policy is not the whole of political morality, I should not be allowed to end Part Four there. The morality as well as the utility of virtue can be questioned. I must face the legitimate fears of those who distrust the very concept of public virtue. They distrust, and should distrust, leaders and citizens who claim to be possessors of civic virtue. Their fears fall under four heads:

a) Virtue ethics is impractical. It does not provide a problem-solving mechanism. This is in part correct, but should not be fear-inducing, for the reasons asserted above.

b) Appeals to civic virtue often justify evasions of accountability. The virtuous one seems to be saying "trust me" rather than acknowledging specific interests or obligations. In the extreme he may seem to be acting

the demagogic part played by Robespierre, who said:

> If the driving force of popular government in peacetime is virtue, that of popular government during a revolution is both virtue and terror: virtue, without which terror is destructive; terror, without which virtue is impotent. Terror is . . . less a distinct principle than a consequence of the general principle of democracy applied to the most pressing needs of the *patrie*.[36]

Fear of such excesses is warrented, but is easily misdirected. Neither the virtue ethicist, who speaks for virtue, nor the citizen and leader who strives for virtue, can virtuously use virtue as a screen for irresponsible actions. How could a man or woman of *sophrosyne* say to anyone, "Trust me. I know what is right." let alone advocate terror? Every public claim of virtue is unvirtuous.

c) Appeals to civic virtue are elitist. There is an implicit elitism in discussions of civic virtue if only because virtue has so often been in short supply. But the weightier part of the objection is similar to the fear of lack of accountability. The threat comes not from the virtuous, or from the concept of virtue itself, but from the unvirtuous who misuse the concept. That there are, in fact, elites of virtue, or of intelligence, or of talent, or of wealth (all different), poses a problem for traditional democratic theory: but that is a different problem from the one confronting us here.

d) An emphasis on civic virtue may be a psychological escape from the lack of private virtue. John Chapman discusses the urge displayed by some people "toward a fusion of the personal and the political":

> This urge toward fusion may be. . . the realization of an impulse to violence. It may be the mark of psychic insecurity and ethical immaturity, of a failure to achieve identity and ethical consolidation. . . . Persons in this condition are not likely to have a strong sense of privacy for they lack a firm and well-defined sense of self. Nor are they likely to be respecters of the claims of personality in others. They are not so much fusing as confusing the personal and political dimensions of life.[37]

That such personality types abound is evident enough. Again, however, their existence does not constitute an argument against the application of virtue-ethics to political life. And few conceptions of civic virtue would validate using public categories mainly to compensate for personal inadequacies.

These remarks certainly do not constitute a full case for the political efficacy of virtue-ethics, but they may have suggested that a case can be made.

PART FIVE: HOW MAY PRIVATE ETHICS AND PUBLIC ETHICS, PRIVATE VIRTUE AND PUBLIC VIRTUE, BEST BE RECONCILED?

The realm of the private and the realm of the public cannot be fully reconciled in any pluralistic society. Yet an impulse toward wholeness leads us to try. At the least we might hope to overcome some of the confusion about what is properly private. Schools that try to educate and not merely train can scarcely be private, even though they may be non-governmental. Automotive corporations can scarcely be private, whatever their pattern of ownership, so long as their emissions foul the air breathed by non-owners. The political schizophrenia of patriotic privatism is illustrated by a recent speech of Howard Jarvis, the guru of the California tax-revolters. Within the space of a paragraph he said "We must remember that the government is the enemy of the people" and "Our system of government is the greatest on earth."[38]

The friend-enemy distinction, so close to the surface of political consciousness, is the common explanation for discrepancies between private morality and public amorality. We are generous to our friends, but not to foreign powers. We are honest with our children, but aim to deceive our political adversaries. Yet, the fear of enemies is scarcely a complete explanation of the motivations behind the harsher forms of politics. The lust for power can lead us to deceive our friends and even ourselves as well as our adversaries. Greed can deny food to our allies as surely as fear can deny arms to our enemies. False pride can lead us to hire politicians to do our dirty work for us, and sloth can shut our eyes to the

act of our complicity. If the old virtues are not gone, neither are the old vices. Why else need we talk of virtue?

Culture, human nature, and elusive spirit combine in unique admixture to fix us where we are, yet drive us on. We tell the world to leave us alone and retreat into undisturbed privacy only to find we want the world and the world wants us. We are driven by self-preservation, but the self we wish to preserve is just a bit more adventurous and, paradoxically, a bit more comfortable than we presently are. We want neither the world of complete privacy nor the all too real world of poverty that is the lot of most of the earth's inhabitants.

Two intellectual positions, or clusters of positions, emerge. One group says with Locke and Mill and Strawson: it takes all kinds to make a world; let us be tolerant above all, and glory in diversity. Another group says, with Plato and Hegel and Marx: we cannot be ourselves unless, in some fashion, we become one with the whole world.

These two positions can probably never be formally or fully reconciled. And if they cannot, the liberals would seem to win by default. Yet it may be wrong to see the contrast as a contest to be won. Liberal education, which is to say, "classical" education, was probably as important an ingredient in the consciousness of Mill and Strawson as in Hegel or Marx. There is no "solution" to the case of the missing civic virtue; but a prerequisite to clearer sight aimed at the direction of improvement may lie in adequate political education, which is a form of moral education, which is a subhead of liberal education.[39] It is not a requirement for adequate political edu-

cation that we be morally certain or wholly unified as a community. Aristotle: ". . . matters concerned with conduct and questions of what is good for us have no fixity, any more than matters of health."[40] Education in civic virtue will not enable us to describe the perfect polity any more than we can describe the perfect human body, but we know what getting better means when we are sick. The liberally educated person is no more a predictable consequence of certain pedagogical techniques than is the virtuous person. A theory of civic virtue, then, and its partner a theory of political education, can prescribe and describe, it can guide and evaluate, but it cannot produce results as technique can. The so-called "values clarification" technique, born of the current desire to introduce or reintroduce moral teaching in the schools, has a largely negative relationship to civic education, for it turns the teacher into a value-neutral technician, thereby contradicting in practice its avowed aim of moral education.

Liberal education, insofar as it is founded on Socrates and Plato, is both insistent on the importance of a rationalizable virtue and ambivalent about its ontological status. Virtue for Socrates was an inner principle of being that could organize one's whole life; yet, as *Meno* reminds us, virtue is not a fixed quality that can be directly taught.[41] It comes, ultimately, as a gift. The open-endedness of the Socratic method is what justifies the label liberal education; but its openness is a directed quest, not a surrender to pluralism, as modern liberalism tends to be. If Plato, as Philip Merlan once observed, does not leave us instructed, he leaves us cross-examined.[42]

Aretē for the twentieth century cannot be Greek *aretē*, but Socratic wisdom would never insist that it should be. Free thought may be no more

consistent with a rejuvenated Greek *polis* than with a new African state or a corporate board room. Modern liberalism assumes that free thought is a by-product of the free market, but holders of that view, like every other, may need to be cross-examined.

This discussion of civic virtue has led to an awareness of the need for a developed theory of political education. It cannot be the function of this paper to provide that developed theory. I end with a question: can political science as presently constituted be the basis for such a developed theory of political education?

FOOTNOTES

[1]For further development of these issues see my "Three Forms of Political Ethics", *Western Political Quarterly*, 31(March, 1977), 7-18 and the literature cited there, especially Alan Coddington, "Utilitarianism Today", *Political Theory*, 4(May, 1976), 213-26.

[2]See Peter Winch, *Ethics and Action* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1972), p. 176. Compare with Richard Flathman's subtle defense of utilitarianism in *Political Obligation* (New York: Atheneum, 1972), pp. 201-3, 233-34.

[3]James Cargile, "Utilitarianism and the Desert Island Problem", *Analysis* 25(1964), 23-4.

[4]John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1971), pp. 33, 572-3; and sections 5, 14, 30, 47, 50.

[5]Cf. David Lyons, *Forms and Limits of Utilitarianism* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965); J.J.C. Smart and Bernard Williams, *Utilitarianism: For and Against* (New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1973); Harry S. Silverstein, "Simple and General Utilitarianism", *Philosophical Review*, 83(July, 1974), 339-63; Michael D. Bayles, ed., *Contemporary Utilitarianism* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1968); Peter Singer, "Is Act Utilitarianism Self-Defeating?" *Philosophical Review*, 81(1972), 94-105; J.O. Urmson, "Saints and Heroes" in A.I. Melden, ed., *Essays in Moral Philosophy* (Seattle: Univ. of Washington Press, 1958), pp. 198-216; and the critique of Urmson by Christopher New, "Saints, Heroes and Utilitarianism", *Philosophy*, 49(April, 1974), 179-89. The issue between Urmson and New is whether utilitarianism can concede a class of actions which would produce greater happiness than any other, but

which it is not our duty to perform---in effect, the problem of supererogation. Such a discussion shows how far present-day utilitarianism is from classical utilitarianism. The latter is closer to liberal political assumptions.

[6]W.D. Hudson, *Reason and Right* (San Francisco: Freeman, Cooper & Co., 1970), p. 128.

[7]*Philosophy*, 36(1961), 1-17. Reprinted in G. Wallace and A.D.M. Walker, *The Definition of Morality* (London: Methuen, 1970), pp. 98-118. Subsequent page references are to this volume.

[8]*Ibid.*, p. 109.

[9]Strawson, *ibid.*, p. 100. Prior quotations, pp. 111, 114. This liberal position may be an expression of what Rawls treats as the intuitionism of a plurality of first principles. *op. cit.*, p. 35.

[10]Strawson, *ibid.*, p. 118. Prior quotation, p. 116.

[11]See *inter alia*, Peter Winch, "Understanding a Primitive Society", in *Ethics and Action*, pp. 8-49; Peter Berger, *Pyramids of Sacrifice* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday-Anchor, 1976); Claude Levi-Strauss, *The Savage Mind* (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1966); Mircea Eliade, *The Sacred and the Profane* (New York: Harper-Torchbooks, 1961).

[12]Unger, *Knowledge and Politics* (New York: Free Press, 1975), p. 25.

[13]*Ibid.*, p. 26.

[14]Arendt, *On Revolution* (New York: Viking Compass, 1965), pp. 283-4.

[15]*Nichomachean Ethics*, 1105b - 1106a.

[16]Lawrence Becker, *On Justifying Moral Judgments* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1973), pp. 164-7.

[17]MacIntyre, "The Nature of Virtue", Unpublished Manuscript. February, 1978.

[18]Cf. MacIntyre, review of books by Fried, Bok and Ramsey in *The New Republic*, May 6, 1978.

[19]E.F. Carritt (*The Theory of Morals*.London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1928, pp. 136-7) once set forth intriguing distinctions between moral, virtuous, saintly, and holy. An act done because we think it right and for that reason simply, he said, is a moral act. An act done because we think it right which we desire to do and which act is in fact usually right, he called virtuous. An act done because we desire always to do right acts as such, rather than desire to do this specific act, he called saintly. And a right act done without desire at all he called holy.

[20]Aristotle, *Nichomachean Ethics*, 1134a, 25, 29-30. Quotation is W.D. Ross trans. Whereas Aristotle believed, as we have seen, that virtues are neither emotions nor capacities, but characteristics (1106a), for Rawls virtues are "sentiments . . . related families of dispositions and propensities regulated by a higher-order desire. . ." Later, he calls a "sense of justice" one of the "fundamental virtues. . . among the broadly based properties that it is rational for members of a well-ordered society to want in one another." Still later, virtues are called "excellences. They are good from the standpoint of ourselves as well as from that of others." *Theory of Justice*, pp. 192, 436, 445, respectively.

[21]Aristotle, *Nichomachean Ethics*, 1135b.

[22]Dent, "Virtues and Actions", *Philosophical Quarterly*, 25(October, 1975), 318-35.

[23]Baldassare Castiglione, *The Book of the Courtier*. Friench Simpson, trans. (New York: Unger, 1959).

[24]George Kateb, "Freedom and Worldliness in the Thought of Hannah Arendt", *Political Theory* 5(May, 1977), 141-82.

[25]See *The Human Condition* (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1958), pp. 73-8, 242; *On Revolution* (New York: Viking-Compass, 1965), pp. 61-94; *Crises of the Republic* (New York: Harcourt, Brace Jovanovich, 1972), p. 60; and other references cited by Kateb.

[26]Strauss, *The City and Man* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1964), p. 97.

[27]Aurel Kolnai, *Ethics, Value and Reality*. Bernard Williams and David Wiggins, eds. (Indianapolis: Hackett Pub. Co., 1978), p. 117.

[28]*Apology*, 30a-b.

[29]Burnyeat, "Virtues in Action", in Gregory Vlastos, ed. *The Philosophy of Socrates* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday-Anchor,1971), pp. 209-34.

[30]Prichard, "Does Moral Philosophy Rest Upon a Mistake?" *Mind* 21(1912) 21-37, at 33. The essay is reprinted in H.A. Prichard, *Moral Obligation* (London: Oxford University Press, 1949). See the critiques by Stanley Cunningham, "Does 'Does Moral Philosophy Rest Upon a Mistake?' Make an Even Greater Mistake?" and William Frankena, "Prichard and the Ethics of Virtue", both in *The Monist* 54(1970) 1-17, 86-99.

[31]See Laird's *An Inquiry Into Moral Notions* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1935), and his "Act Ethics and Agent Ethics" *Mind* 55(1946) 113-32.

[32]*The Science of Ethics* (New York: Putnam's, 1882), pp. 155, 158. Quoted in William Frankena, *Ethics* (englewood Cliffs, New Jersey; Prentice-Hall, 1963), p. 49.

[33]Frankena, *Ethics*, p. 50.

[34]Hare, *Freedom and Reason* (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1962), ch. 3.

[35]This point is made by D.Z. Phillips and H.O. Mounce in *Moral Practices* (New York: Schocken Books, 1970), p. 80.

[36]Maximilien Robespierre, Speech of February 5, 1794, in *Oeuvres*, Tome X, ed. Marc Boulviseau et Albert Soboul (Paris, 1967), p. 357. Trans. by James E. Miller in "Defining Democracy", unpublished manuscript.

[37]John Chapman, "Personality and Privacy" in *Privacy*, Nomos XIII, J.R. Pennock and J. Chapman, eds. (New York: Atherton, 1971), pp. 236-55 at 239. That I quote Chapman in this context should not be interpreted to mean that he is a critic of virtue-ethics.

[38]Public Speech, Claremont, California, May 29, 1978.

[39]See Richard M. Bank and Steven R. McCarl, "'Virtue, Obligation and Politics' Revisited", *American Political Science Review*, 70(September, 1976) 886-904 and literature cited there.

[40]*Nichomachean Ethics*, 1104a, 4-5. W.D. Ross trans.

[41]*Laches*, 190d-191e, 192a-193d; *Charmides*, 159b-160d; *Republic*, 352d-354a; *Meno* Burnyeat, *op. cit.*, and, in the same volume, Gerasimos Santas, "Socrates at Work on Virtue and Knowledge in Plato's *Laches*", pp. 177-208.

[42]Philip Merlan, "Form and Content in Plato's Philosophy", *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 8(1947) 407-30.